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Introduction

The reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions arising from industrial production without hampering the economic activity is a key policy goal for most developed economies.
To minimize the abatement cost, the economic literature advocates for market-based instruments aimed at providing incentives to the firms with the lowest abatement costs to
reduce emissions first. In 2003, the EU established the European Union Emission Trading
System (EU ETS), an emission allowances trading scheme. Today, it is the largest emissions cap-and-trade scheme in the world, covering approximately 11,000 energy-intensive
installations in the power generation and manufacturing sector, amounting to 40% of the
EU’s GHG emissions.
The introduction of the EU ETS was accompanied by a fierce debate on its potential
impact on the performance and competitiveness of regulated firms. Economists traditionally think that environmental regulations add costs to firms and divert resources away from
productive activities, thereby slowing down productivity. This view implicitly assumes
that the opportunity cost of polluting distorts firms’ optimal production choices(Gray,
1987). In contrast, according to the Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991), once firms expect
higher prices on emissions relative to other costs of production, they have an incentive
to make operational changes and invest in new emissions-reducing technologies, with a
possible positive impact on their performance (Porter, 1991; Porter and Van der Linde,
1995). Therefore, providing empirical evidence of the effect of the EU ETS on firms’ performance, as well as understanding how firms change their production choices accordingly,
has first order policy implications.
In this paper we identify the causal effect of the EU ETS on firms’ production, identifying how it has affected total output produced and input usage. As a measure of
performance, we focus on total factor productivity (TFP) a highly policy-relevant measure of firms’ efficiency.1 We provide a conceptual framework to test whether the EU ETS
is merely increasing firms’ costs, or if it is pushing them towards a more efficient production. When compared to firms not subject to the policy, we observe a differential increase
in expenditures for intermediates in the firms subject to it; but almost no change in other
inputs. We interpret these results as evidence of a change in input mix. In addition, we
1

For example, it is has been shown to be the main driver of GDP growth in advanced economies
(Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997).
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show the policy has an overall small but negative impact on TFP; however, this effect is
heterogeneous across industries. Our results suggest that the majority of industries do
not face the right incentives to undergo substantial changes in their production processes,
but prefer to adjust only marginally, predominantly through fuel switches.
Our first contribution is building a novel and comprehensive dataset of Italian manufacturing firms, which combines balance-sheet data with the EU ETS registry. Italy is
the third largest manufacturing country in Europe. Therefore, it is of utmost importance
to evaluate the impact of such a policy (targeted to the manufacturing sector); especially
considering that the Italian government has expressed concerns about its potential negative effect.2 To sum up, Italy seems a very relevant case to look at, and the sample in
our hands, which is representative of the population of Italian manufacturing firms, the
right tool to properly look at this issue.
To identify the causal effect of EU ETS on input expenditures and gross output, we
develop an empirical framework taking into account the non-random selection into policy.
Firms fall within the regulation scope if their thermal or output capacity are above certain
thresholds. These capacities are known only to firms and regulators. To accommodate
this selection mechanism, we follow the literature and base our identification strategy on a
difference-in-differences approach, conditioned on predictors of enrollment into treatment
(Calel and Dechezlepretre, 2016; Colmer et al., 2018). The Italian manufacturing sector
is an especially suitable candidate for this study. It is characterized by substantial size
heterogeneity of its firms, allowing us to construct a suitable control group for our treated
firms.
Our second contribution is investigating which channels explain the reduced form evidence using a structural model of production. We estimate firms’ production functions,
building on the empirical literature on TFP estimation (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn
and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg et al., 2015).3 Crucially, we depart from standard assumptions, allowing output elasticities with respect to inputs and TFP to vary as a function
2
In the last decades, Italy’s per capita GDP has decreased by around 1% every 10 years. This
deterioration in growth prospects mainly results from a substantial zeroing of productivity growth in all
productive sectors (Calligaris, 2015).
3
By using a control function approach, we take into account that inputs are endogenous functions
of TFP and we are able to structurally model the policy’s effect. By contrast, Greenstone et al. (2012)
measure productivity using index number measures. The underlying assumption is that firms face no
adjustment costs of input, a rather implausible assumption especially considering capital and material
inputs.
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of the policy introduction. This allows us to study how factor-specific productivities have
been affected the policy.
Our third contribution is raising and addressing a problem of inference validity common in this literature. It is common to perform conditional difference-in-differences on
the TFP obtained from a control function estimate of the production function. To obtain
valid inference, we argue that it is necessary to include the associated estimation error in
providing confidence intervals for the treatment effect. When the conditional diff-in-diff
uses non-parametric conditioning (e.g. matching), this correction is computationally too
cumbersome. Our approach consists in controlling for selection directly in the production
function estimation procedure and using standard bootstrapping techniques for inference.
We refer to the literature that studies the effect of firms’ endogenous productivity change
resulting from investments in export (De Loecker, 2013) or knowledge (Doraszelski and
Jaumandreu, 2013), augmenting their approach by controlling for possible confounders
to treatment in the law of motion of productivity. We show that this approach provides
effects that are similar in sign, but smaller in magnitude than using the productivity
estimates as the outcome variable in a diff-in-diff.
Our fourth contribution consists in showing that the EU ETS had a small and negative
effect on TFP, although with mixed results across industries. Therefore, our paper does
not fully support the Porter (1991) hypothesis, at least in the period analyzed. It must
be noticed that our paper provides a different test on the Porter’s hypothesis with respect
to those in the existing literature, as non of it fully discusses the ways through which
firms adjust their production choices. Indeed, Greenstone et al. (2012) look at the Clean
Air Act,4 a command and control instrument, while Porter’s argument refers to market
based type of policies such as the European cap-and-trade system.5 Recent studies focus
on the causal effect of the EU ETS, but without discussing the impact of this policy on
firm production choices (Martin et al., 2015; Jaraite et al., 2016; Klemetsen et al., 2020).6
Lutz (2016), Marin et al. (2018) and Löschel et al. (2019) investigate how total factor
productivity was affected by the EU ETS, but do not disentangle the different effects
on performance or provide an explanation on the channels that determine a change in
4

They show in a simple model how regulatory mandates require inputs that are not directly useful for
production, leading to a reduction in TFP.
5
See Ambec et al. (2013) for a review of the literature on Porter’s hypothesis.
6
Studies investigating the impact of EU ETS showed that it reduces the CO2 emissions and triggers
the development of new low-carbon technologies throughout Europe (Colmer et al., 2018; Calel and
Dechezlepretre, 2016; Petrick and Wagner, 2014).
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the production function. We go beyond their approach in two ways. First, we allow the
production function to change with the policy. This is important for us: it allows to
study how the policy has affected individual factor productivity on top of total factor
productivity. Moreover, not allowing the production function to depend explicitly on
a policy variable raises problems of identification of the TFP. Second, we innovate on
the methodology: we complement the approach already used in Lutz (2016) and Marin
et al. (2018) to estimate the effects on TFP with an alternative one which provides valid
inference. In those papers, the estimates of TFP are used as a dependent variable in a
matching procedure without adjusting for the fact that the variable is estimated with error
and that standard bootstrapping procedures are not consistent. In contrast, we elaborate
a fully coherent structural model to identify the firms’ reactions to the introduction of the
policy, as well as the effect on TFP across different industries, which also provides valid
standard errors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes some institutional features of EU ETS and the data. Section 3 provides a conceptual framework.
Section 4 presents the conditional difference-in-differences approach and in Section 5 we
discuss the empirical strategy for estimating the production function. Section 6 presents
results and Section 7 concludes.

2

The EU ETS

The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme for CO2 emissions: each regulated plant has to
offset emissions with a permit. The total number of permits, called EU Allowance Units
(EUA), is set at the European level. Each plant receives or purchases allowances that
can be traded with other regulated emitters in all countries participating to the scheme.
At the end of each period (April of the next year), firms must surrender a number of
allowances equivalent to the verified emissions. Non-compliant firms pay a penalty of
A
C100 per ton of CO2 they fail to offset.7
The policy was first announced in 2003 and came into effect in 2005. It was introduced
in three phases that differed in the allowance allocation mechanism, sectoral scope and
regulated polluters. During Phase 1 (2005-2007) all EUAs were allocated through grand7

A
C40 in the fist phase.
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fathering on the basis of industry-wide benchmarks and calculated for each firm according
to their installed capacity and historical activity levels. Banking of allowances was not
allowed. The cap was reduced by 6.5% in Phase 2 (2008-2013). Phase 3 (2014-2020) had
an emission reduction target of 20%. Free allowance allocation was further reduced in
the manufacturing sector from the initial 80% of total allowances, towards the declared
target of 30%.8
The EU ETS regulation applies to combustion installations with a rated thermal input
exceeding 20MW. Some productive processes are subject to stricter conditions based on
output capacity. These “process regulated sectors” include paper products, manufacturing
of coke and refined petroleum products, glass ceramics and cement, and basic metals.9
Treatment status of different plants depend on their physical characteristics, which are
hard to manipulate in the short run.
Figure 1: Allowances price trend.

30
Delivery period

EUA future price €

Phase
Phase
Phase
Phase

1
2
2
3

(2007)
(2009)
(2012)
(2016)

20

10

0
2005

2010

2015

Notes: The figure reports prices of future contracts with EUAs as underlying assets for four different delivery years (EEX
CFI ICE). Source: Thomson Reuters.

The EUA prices are determined in the market and have followed the evolution showed
in Figure 1. Prices have dropped on several occasions, reaching historical lows in 2014 as
a result of an unanticipated low demand for allowances. These drops have raised concerns
about the efficacy of this policy, considered far below most estimates of the social cost of
carbon.10 Despite periods of low spot prices at the end of the first phase caused by firms’
8

For a comprehensive review see Ellerman et al. (2016).
For further details on sectors and thresholds see Appendix B.
10
For instance, an estimation by Nordhaus (2017) place the social cost of carbon at 31 2010US$.
9

6
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1380

8

D'Arcangelo et al.: The Impact of the European Carbon Market on Firm Productivit

inability to bank allowances, prices have rarely fallen below A
C5. Even at prices far from
the social cost of carbon, the financial impact of the EU ETS on firms is relevant because
of emissions offsetting.
The case of the Italian manufacturing sector is particularly interesting in this context
because many firms exhibited a positive net demand of allowances. Figure 2 shows that
the total expenditures for emissions of Italian manufacturing firms was sizable: 2% of
their sales on average. The figure also shows that these expenditures have decreased over
time, not only following the reduction in prices but also as a consequence of lower demand.

5
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Opportunity cost of emissions / Sales
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Figure 2: Emissions and emission intensity.
Italian manufacturing firms.

Year
Verified emissions (Mt)

Opportunity cost of emissions / Sales

Notes: The figure reports data from Italian manufacturing firms regulated by the EU ETS. The dashed line refers to the
total emissions of CO2 and the solid line to the average emission intensity (opportunity cost of the verified emissions / real
gross output).

Because of the generous free allocation of allowances at the beginning of each year,
in many countries the majority of firms subject to the EU ETS were net suppliers of
allowances to the market. This is not the case for Italian firms, whose initial free allocation
was often insufficient to cover their total demand. Figure 3 (left panel) shows that,
until 2014, the total allowances allocated to the manufacturing sector in Italy surpassed
the verified emissions. The marginal cost of emitting is the same whether firms are
in allowances surplus or deficit. This is because the marginal cost of purchasing one
allowance or not selling one allowance is the same. However, the total cost of the policy
is heterogeneous and depends on the initial allocation of allowances and the emission
decision. A firm in allowance surplus experienced a benefit from the policy. The right
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panel in Figure 3 shows that there were roughly as many net buyers as net sellers of
allowances. Contrary to many other countries which had only firms at a surplus, roughly
half of the Italian regulated firms have suffered an increase in costs from the policy.

15
20

10
20

20

05

0

50

20000

100

40000

N. installations
150

Thousands of ton of CO2

200

60000

250

80000

Figure 3: Short and long positions by year.
Italian manufacturing firms.

0

Anno
Allocated - Verified emissions

Verified emissions

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Net buyers

Free allowances allocated

Net sellers

Notes: The figure reports data from Italian manufacturing firms regulated by the ETS. The left panel shows the total net
position (number of allowances-number of verified emissions) of Italian manufacturing plants. The red dashed line refers
to the total emissions of CO2 and the dash-dotted line to the total allowances allocated. The right panel shows separately
total long positions (allowances ≥ emissions) and total short positions (allowances ≤ emissions).

In summary, given the characteristics of the monitoring mechanisms, firms can pursue
three alternative strategies to reduce their emissions. They can either switch to less
polluting fuels, change their production processes, or reduce output.11 We formalize this
argument in Section 4.

3

Data

We put together a unique and comprehensive database of Italian manufacturing firms,
built from several sources.
First, the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) database contains address, verified emissions and free allowances received by each installation.12 It is maintained by
11

Given the characteristics of CO2 and the existing technology, no economically viable end-of-pipe
abatement technology has been used.
12
An installation is a stationary technical unit where one or more specific polluting activities is carried
out. In our sample, 97%of installations coincide with a plant. We observe ten plants with multiple
installations.
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the European Commission and publicly available on its website. This allow us to identify
firms with production plants in Italy subject to EU ETS between 2005 and 2015.
Second, the CERVED database contains balance sheet information for all Italian limited liability companies. The data are recorded by the Italian Registry of Companies and
include financial statements filed at the Italian Chambers of Commerce. In particular, the
information includes credit reports, company profiles and summary financial statements
(balance sheet, profit and loss accounts and ratios). Data are available for each year
between 1995 and 2015. We grouped the manufacturing firms into 2-digit industries according to the ATECO 2002 classification of economic activities.13 We take from balance
sheet data measures of output, labor, intermediates and capital inputs. We measure labor
input using the cost of labor and the capital stock using the book value of fixed capital net
of depreciation.14 Intermediates are measured as purchases net of changes in inventories
during the period. These variables are deflated through industry-specific deflators coming
from the OECD STAN database (base year 2010).15 We clean the database from outliers
by dropping all observations with negative values for real value added, cost of labor or
capital stock.
To match the two databases, we aggregated the EUTL data on installations at the
firm-level and matched them to CERVED based on names and addresses. We matched
98% of firms in the CERVED database with the EUTL. We restricted the sample to active
firms and excluded power generators. The final sample of regulated firms includes 497
firms. Table 1 reports details on the number of installations and firms under regulation
for each of the three phases.
In addition, we complement the firm-level data with plant-level information obtained
from the ISTAT dataset Asia, to check how many plants of a firm are under regulation.
Among the regulated firms, 44% are mono-plants and 25% have two plants. Moreover,
50% of firms have all their plants regulated under ETS. Only 25% of the firms have less
13

This is the Italian classification of economic activities elaborated by the National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT) according to the Nace Rev 1.1 (Reg. Commission n.29/2002).
14
We compute the capital stock using the book value of fixed capital net of depreciation as the investment variable is not available in the data in hand: computing the capital stock through the Perpetual
Inventory Method (PIM) is thus unfeasible. Note, however, that both approaches are characterized by
sources of measurement errors. See, for instance, Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2016).
15
Specifically, we use: production (gross output) deflator for gross output; value added deflator for
labor input; gross fixed capital formation deflator for capital input; intermediate inputs deflator for
intermediates.
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than half of their plants regulated under ETS.16 This is reassuring because it means that
most of the firms cannot relocate their production in non-regulated plants.
Table 1: EUTL summary statistics
Installations under regulation
Firms under regulation
- Manufacturing

Phase I Phase II Phase III Total
1041
1163
1236
1516
563
670
740
837
446
475
425
497

Note: The table reports details on the number of Italian installations and firms under regulation as
reported in the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL).

Table 2: Descriprive Statistics
Mean

St. Dev.

A. Manufacturing firms (N. obs: 92,124 )
Real Value Added
1.91
30.38
Real Gross Output
8.52
121.0
Real Cost of Capital
1.67
16.46
Real Cost of Labor
1.16
7.519
Real Cost of Intermediates
4.71
89.35
B. Manufacturing firms, under EU ETS (N. obs:
Real Value Added
59.6
393.9
Real Gross Output
267.1
1267.0
Real Cost of Capital
63.0
187.9
Real Cost of Labor
25.8
68.16
Real Cost of Intermediates 158.6
862.9

5th
pctile

25th
pctile

50th
pctile

75th
pctile

95th
pctile

0.038
0.15
0.008
0.021
0.009
492)
0.97
4.26
1.40
0.57
1.38

0.16
0.58
0.05
0.11
0.15

0.42
1.51
0.20
0.29
0.56

1.10
4.28
0.83
0.75
1.92

5.54
23.6
5.28
3.58
12.4

3.78
14.6
5.94
2.04
5.89

12.2
51.8
17.2
6.70
23.5

37.0
166.7
48.7
21.2
90.1

227.6
836.8
231.8
119.5
441.1

Notes: All variables are in million of euro deflated using 2010 prices.
An observation is a firm. All the statistics refer to the year 2003. We report the distribution of real value added, real gross
output, real cost of capital, labor and intermediaries for all the manufacturing firms and for the ones under regulation.

Our empirical strategy to estimate the impact of the policy hinges on the comparison
between firms under the EU ETS and firms with similar characteristics that are not. Table
2 shows descriptive statistics for the production variables we investigate. In particular,
we stress two elements which guide our comparison: firms subject to the policy are on
average bigger than the others, but there are same-sized firms in the two groups.
Finally, we relied on qualitative data to complement and reinforce our quantitative
analysis. We reviewed technical reports from trade associations discussing the possible
strategies adopted in recent years to reduce GHG emissions. Further, some informa16

ASIA database does not distinguish between productive plants and administrative branches. If a
firm has the offices at a different address it would result in a non-regulated plant.
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tion related to technology adoption at industry level is contained in the “Best Available
Technique” reference document.17

4

Conceptual framework

We discuss in this section how firms react to the introduction of emission prices, providing
a conceptual framework to interpret the empirical results.
We consider a firm i at time t with a (industry-specific) Cobb-Douglas production
function, generating gross output (yit ) from labor (lit ), capital (kit ) and intermediates
(mit ).
The Cobb-Douglas production function expressed in logs is:
yit = βl lit + βk kit + βm mit + ωit ,

(1)

where ωit is a persistent term reflecting the (log) total factor productivity. As standard
in the literature, we assume that capital is a dynamic input and predetermined at time t,
meaning that it can only be adjusted with delay, to accommodate time-to-build. In contrast, intermediates are a static input that can be adjusted flexibly by the firm throughout
t. Intermediates are of particular interest for us, as they include expenditures for each fuel
and polluting intermediate good, albeit in an unknown proportion. Finally, we assume
labor to be a static input, in the sense that current levels of labor do not affect future
profits18 . However, firms adjust labor to the realization of productivity ωit . We interpret
a positive price of emissions as an indirect increase in the cost of intermediates. Therefore
we expect firms to react in one of the following ways.
First, an increase in price determines a decrease in the demand for intermediates, mit .
With decreasing marginal returns, lit should decrease immediately, while kit decreases
with an adjustment. From a reduction in inputs, it follows a reduction in output yit .
This intuitive result takes place if no other element in equation (1) changes with the
introduction of the policy.
Second, the firm can vary the mix of intermediates, on top of the total expenditure for
17

“Best Available Technique” reference document is carried out in the Framework of Article 13(1) of
the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED, 2010/75/EU).
18
Alternatively, we could have considered dynamic labor. We follow most of the recent literature
on production function estimation (De Loecker, 2011; Collard-Wexler and De Loecker, 2014), but our
approach is flexible and our results are robust to this alternative.
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this input. Imagine a paper mill that can choose between two sources to produce energy
needed for production: coal or biomass. Coal is cheaper, but biomass are exempted
from the EU ETS emission inventory. For sufficiently high prices of emissions, the firm
will therefore switch from the former energy source to the latter. Switching costs are
often negligible, as some fuels are completely substitutable in production. As a result, a
positive price of emissions could be associated with the apparently paradoxical effect of
an increase in intermediates expenditures. A flexible form of (1), in which βm is allowed
to vary with the introduction of the policy, can help rationalize this effect. While the
“true” production function of the firm remains unchanged, i.e. the marginal productivity
of each fuel does not change, a varying βm can capture whether the fuel mix itself has
changed.19
Finally, firms might undergo more structural changes in production to reduce the negative effect of emission pricing. In response to a positive price of emissions, firms might
intervene by fine-tuning or completely changing their production processes. As suggested
in Porter (1991), the incentive to reorganize and improve the firm’s environmental performance may help spur actions that positively spillover to production. These changes can
take place through investments in new equipment and new technologies but also through a
more efficient use of the extant ones made possible by investments in R&D and organizational or optimization efforts. We expect these changes to have an effect on productivity,
ωit , and possibly on the input elasticities, {βr }r=l,k,m . If the firms realized considerable
tangible investments, we could even expect an increase in kit .

5
5.1

Empirical Model
Treatment assignment and conditional difference-in-differences

First, we are interested in estimating the causal impact of the EU ETS on firm-level
production choices. Changes in output or inputs can be interpreted under the lens of
the conceptual framework of the previous section to investigate firms’ reaction to the
policy. Selection into treatment is not random and this needs to be taken into account
19

We avoid adopting a value added production function not to rule out this effect. With a value added
production function intermediates are a perfect complement to production and their demand is perfectly
determined. We decide thus to adopt this more general approach, allowing some substitutability of
intermediates with other inputs, even if it might pose challenges to identification.
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to isolate a causal effect of the EU ETS. If we could observe thermal input and processbased targets around the threshold, we would be able to exploit a regression-discontinuity
design. Since these selection variables are not observed for neither treated and untreated
installations, it is impossible to use this approach nor to form a suitable control group
at the installation level. We thus follow the prevalent literature (Petrick and Wagner,
2014; Calel and Dechezlepretre, 2016; Colmer et al., 2020) and form a control group at
the firm level, exploiting the fact that variation in treatment at the installation level
causes sufficient variation in treatment. We define a treated firm as having at least one
installation under EU ETS, helping to take into account potential within-firm spillovers
(Colmer et al., 2020), although the prevalence of mono-plant firms limits the relevance of
this channel.
Because larger, treated installations tend to belong to larger firms, we control for
potential unobservable confounders, conditioning our estimates to a set of firms’ characteristics. This approach exploits the fact that treatment variation can be observed within
comparable groups of firms. We estimate four conditional difference-in-differences: three
parametric and one semi-parametric based on matching. The difference-in-differences
approach has been successfully used in the evaluation of cap-and-trade schemes (Fowlie
et al., 2012). It is attractive for our purposes because it exploits both time and crosssectional variations in the policy assignment to take into account potential unobserved
confounders. This approach works under an assumption of “parallel trends”: in the absence of treatment, the evolution in firms’ outcomes would have been the same in the
treatment and control group, conditional on observable firms’ characteristics. We test
this assumption exploiting the time dimension of our panel (see Appendix C).
We denote with Yit our outcomes of interest: the deflated gross output and the deflated
values of labor, capital, and intermediates. Let the policy dummy τt take value of 1 at
the introduction of the policy (e.g. 2005) and be 0 otherwise. The treated firms are those
with plants under the EU ETS for a whole phase and the untreated firms are those never
subject to the policy in any phase. The treatment dummy Di takes value 1 if the firm is
treated and 0 otherwise. Finally, Tit collects the interactions of the time and treatment
dummy.
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The three parametric models are described by the following specification:
Yit = α0 + α1 Di + α2 τt + α3 Tit + f (Xi ) + νit ,

(2)

where α0 is the intercept, α1 , α2 , and α3 are the estimand parameters, Xi is a k × 1 vector
of controls (listed below), and νit is an i.i.d. error term. The three models differ in the
[
way Xi enters into the specification. Here, AT
T = α̂3 is the parameter of interest for each
model and outcome of interest.
We complement our parametric specifications with a semi-parametric one, using a
matching procedure based on the propensity score. This “matched difference-in-differences”
has the advantage of not imposing any of the parametric assumptions on Xi and limits
the analysis to the treated firms that have a comparable counterpart in the control group.
Based on estimates of the propensity score, π̂i , each treated firm gets matched with one
or more firms, whose set we denote with J (π̂i ).

[
AT
T

match

=

1
N1T

2015
X


X

t=2005 i∈Dt



X
1
Yit − 1
Yjt  − T
Mit
N0
j∈J (π̂i )

2004
X


X

t=1995 i∈Dt



X
Yit − 1
Yjt  ,
Mit
j∈J (π̂i )

where N1T and N0T are the observations for treated firms after and before treatment,
respectively; Dt is the set of treated firms at time t; and Mit is the number of matches to
firm i at time t.
5.1.1

Estimation

We choose the control variables Xi based on their correlation with the assignment variable,
their data completeness and especially their possible confounding effect. We consider these
variables at a specific year before the implementation of the policy to control for the prepolicy conditions. In particular, we include in Xi the following control variables: industry,
geographical location, firm’s age, number of workers, and number of plants. To capture
non-linear effects of the variables we also include quadratic transformations of the continuous variables and a full set of interactions (with the exception of geographical location
because of data limitations). For the industry controls we employ 62 dummies according
to the Italian 2-digits ATECO classification, which help to take into account industryspecific unobservables. For geographical location, we consider four intercept shifters for
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each Italian macro-region: north-east, north-west, center, and south and islands. This
variable is especially important for the Italian case due to its spatial heterogeneity and
helps controlling for specific characteristics of the geographical market, including different
exposure to shocks in the foreign output and inputs markets. Firm age is the number of
years since the administrative foundation of the firm. Number of plants and (log) number
of workers are extracted from the values reported for 2004 by the ASIA database, to capture firms size. Size can correlate with selection into treatment, as well as inputs prices
and access to technology, and these two variables control for it.20
Our first specification of (2) includes all the controls linearly, so that f (Xi ) = α4 Xi ,
where α4 is a 1 × k vector of parameters. In the second specification, we include the
propensity score as a control, f (Xi ) = α5 π̂(Xi ), where α5 is a single parameter. The
propensity score is defined as the probability of being included in the treatment conditional on the observables and is estimated in a first stage using a logit specification. The
work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggests that, if the first stage is correctly specified,
this method is equivalent to the previous one. Using the propensity score in a parametric specification is useful to assess the robustness of the matching procedure, leveraging
the entirety of the dataset, rather than only matched firms. We estimate by OLS the
first two models, while the third specification includes firm-level fixed effects. The fixed
effects absorb all firm-specific time-invariant characteristics, including the pre-treatment
observables of the firm. We use a standard within estimator and OLS to estimate this
model.
The matching procedure is as follows. We want to provide narrow matching criteria,
to be sure that the matched firms are similar to the treated firms. As in Calel and
Dechezlepretre (2016) we impose matching within strata defined by the intersection of
industry and geographical region. Exact industry matching controls for industry-wide
exogenous changes in market conditions and accounts for industry-specific innovations in
production. Exact geographical matching, performed on the region, is very important to
control for local market conditions and institutional changes at the local level, which vary
widely in the Italian case. The other controls enter linearly in the logit specifications.21 A
20

In all of our specifications, we also experiment with other controls, extracted from the firms’ 2004
balance sheet accounts and the Italian statistical registry. These include export, inventory, physical
capital depreciation and a different measure for the number of workers. None of these is significant or
affects significantly the results and we therefore exclude them from the analysis.
21
See Appendix A for further details.
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Figure 4: Propensity Score by treatment.
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Notes: We plot the propensity score for treated firms (firms that are under EU ETS in the three phases) and controls
(firms that have never been under EU ETS). We restrict the sample away from 0 and 1 to graphically show the overlapping
region. The matching procedure is furthermore refined by imposing within stratum matching.

visual exploration (Figure 4) suggests that not every treated firm has sufficiently similar
untreated firms to compare to: a majority of firms in our dataset is in fact sensibly
smaller than those under EU ETS. Due to this skeweness in some strata, no match can
be established for firms in Coke and refined products and we do not find a match for 47%
in Textile, concentrated in the South of Italy. Notwithstanding, a common support can
be established for 72% of the firms.
To perform the matching, we opt for a nearest neighbors selection with replacement
and caliper (a threshold in the maximum score distance). Details of our procedure are
given in Appendix A. While the objective of the matching procedure is primarily to
ensure pre-treatment parallel trends, it is reassuring that the outcome variables are not
statistically different between matched treated and control firms in the pre-treatment
period (Table A.1 in Appendix). Our preferred estimates are based on the comparison
with up to five nearest neighbors.22 In our main specification, we impose a caliper equal
to 0.15, roughly equal to three standard deviations of the propensity score, as standard
in the literature.
22

We also explore the options with one and twenty nearest neighbors. Results do not change.
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5.2

Production function approach

Analyzing input and output choices provides the first descriptive evidence of the policy’s
effect. To explain the reduced form evidence and understand more intimately how the
EU ETS has affected production and productivity, we structurally estimate the firms’
production function.
Our approach is characterized by two major features. First, it recognizes the importance of allowing input choices to correlate with a time varying TFP. Employing intermediates to proxy for productivity, we use Ackerberg et al. (2015)’s control function to
address this well-known simultaneity problem. Second, we allow the parameters of the
production function to explicitly depend on the policy variables. We allow the firm’s EU
ETS status to impact its productivity, as well as the other parameters of the production
function. To this end, we use within our structural model the intuition built for the
difference-in-differences to control for sample selection in the treatment.
Let the policy variable dit collect the three dummies, τt , Di and Tit , i.e. it denotes
whether the firm is treated or untreated and whether it is observed in a pre-treatment or
post-treatment year. We consider the following empirical counterpart of (1), allowing it
to depend on the policy variable dit :
yit = y(lit , kit , mit ; ωit , β) = βl (dit )lit + βk (dit )kit + βm (dit )mit + ωit + εit ,

(3)

where εit is an i.i.d. error term capturing unanticipated shocks to production and measurement errors. The estimand parameters are the industry-wide elasticities of output
to labor, capital and intermediates, β = {βr (dit )|r = l, k, m}, and the logarithm of total
factor productivity, ωit . By having β depend explicitly on dit , we allow the production
function to vary between treated and control firms, before and after the introduction of
the policy. Because there are three inputs and four treatment statuses, β is composed
of 12 parameters for each industry. Having such a flexible production function is crucial.
First, it accommodates a more realistic behavior of firms, allowing them to adjust their
productive process as a response to the policy. Capturing this adjustment is an innovative
contribution of this paper. Second, this flexibility is meant to assure that the TFP, which
is a functional of βr and the data, is identified by actual variations in performances and
not by changes in these elasticities.
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We allow ωit to be idiosyncratic and to vary over time. Since inputs are chosen by the
firm with some knowledge of ωit , a clear problem of endogeneity arises in the estimation
of (3). In our setting, as in Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and
Ackerberg et al. (2015), identification relies on a distributional assumption on productivity
and an assumption on inputs demand.23
First, we take distributional assumptions on productivity. Let Iit−1 be the set of
information available in t − 1. We assume that productivity follows a first-order Markov
process, with transition probabilities P (ωit+1 |Iit ) = P (ωit+1 |ωit , zit ), where zit are state
variables affecting the Markov process. We moreover formulate the assumption, common
in this literature, that the innovation to productivity, ξit+1 , is mean independent of all
information known at time t. In practice, we consider the following parametric law-ofmotion for TFP:
ωit+1 = ρ1 ωit + ρ2 ωit2 + ρ3 ωit3 + γ1 Di + γ2 τt + γ3 Tit + γ4 Xi + ξit+1 ,

(4)

where ρ = {ρ1 , ρ2 , ρ3 } and γ = {γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 } are arrays of conformable parameters. We
include two sets of variables in zit : all the policy variables, Di , τt , and Tit as well as
the controls Xi . As in De Loecker (2013) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013), a
law of motion for TFP that includes the policy variables allows for systematic differences
in treatment and control firms. It accommodates a more credible expectation formation
process: if firms expect to update production as a reaction to the policy, they will anticipate the associated change in productivity. Since a higher productivity is associated with
higher inputs, not taking this adjustment into account would bias the estimates of β. Including Xi in zit allows ωit+1 to correlate with the firm’s initial size and to control for the
selection into treatment. Finally, note that we follow the literature (Franco and Marin,
2017; Van Leeuwen and Mohnen, 2017; Ley et al., 2016) and allow the policy variable Ti t
to affect productivity with a lag. This is important in our context, because we allow the
firm to adjust all its inputs (including capital), before imputing any productivity change
to the policy.
23

Differently from them, we assume non linear pricing in intermediates. This assumption, as in Balat
et al. (2016), allows identification of βm . This assumption is credible in our setting because there are
quantity discounts in intermediates introducing a friction in the demand for mit , which is therefore not
completely collinear with (lit , ωit ). Yet, if average prices are different among firms, the question arises
of whether the moment conditions correctly identifies the production function when the price schedule
changes over time. Including controls associated with the size of the firm helps dealing with this problem.
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The second assumption we take is on input demand: in particular we assume that
intermediates demand is a strictly monotone function of ωit , conditional on the state
variables:24
mit = f (ωit , kit , lit , zit ),

(5)

so that f is invertible, given kit , lit , and zit . We can then proxy for the unobservable productivity with the observable demand of intermediates, mit , given the other arguments of
the function, i.e. ωit = f −1 (mit , kit , lit , zit ). We follow De Loecker (2013, 2007) in assuring
monotonicity by letting this demand depend on all relevant state variables through zit .
Since carbon trading is associated with an increase in the cost of intermediates, conditioning demand on the policy variables is crucial. Not doing so leads to an underestimation
of ωit for firms under the EU ETS, because lower material demand is wrongly associated
with lower productivity rather than higher cost.
Finally, we do not observe firm-specific output prices and we must instead use revenues
as a measure of output. This is a well-known and standard problem in the literature. As
a consequence, if this assumption is violated, the estimate of ωit might be upward biased,
if lower input prices or higher output prices correlate with higher levels of ωit . However,
in our application the problem is less severe. First, most firms we consider produce
homogeneous goods in internationally competitive markets. Second, we are controlling
for the firms’ dimension and geographical location, i.e. we compare similar firms in similar
markets. Finally, since we look explicitly at differences in TFP for treated and control
firms, any remaining bias should cancel out. However, we cannot completely disentangle
the effects of the EU ETS on technological productivity and output prices.
5.2.1

Estimation

We perform the estimation of the production function separately for each 2-digit industry.
We split each sample in four: treated and control firms, before and after the policy
implementation. Remembering that each parameter βr (dit ) depends on the policy variable
dit , from now on we suppress the argument for notational simplicity. For our estimation
approach, we follow Ackerberg et al. (2015). By inverting (5), we substitute ωit in (3)
24

Notice that the monotonicity assumption is verified if the firm is choosing mit to maximize its static
profits and the production function takes certain functional forms, e.g. Cobb-Douglas (De Loecker, 2013;
Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2013).
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with f −1 (mit , kit , lit , zit ) to obtain our first stage regression:
yit = φ(lit , kit , mit , zit ) + εit ,

(6)

where φ(lit , kit , mit , zit ) = βl lit +βk kit +βm mit +f −1 (mit , kit , lit , zit ). None of the parameters
are identified at this point because of collinearity between the inputs and ωit . We fit a
polynomial of degree 3 in the arguments to approximate the unknown function, φ(·) and
obtain its estimate, φ̂. We then replace ωit = φ̂it − βl lit − βk kit − βm mit and ωit+1 =
φ̂it+1 − βl lit+1 − βk kit+1 − βm mit+1 in (4), to obtain an expression for ξit+1 as a function
of all the unknown parameters: ξit+1 (β, ρ, γ).25
We obtain estimates for the output elasticities with respect to inputs, β, and the total
factor log-productivity, ωit , in a second stage. The identifying moment conditions are:




k

 it+1 



 mit 
 = 0.
E (ξit+1 + εit+1 ) 




 lit 











zit 









(7)

We form the sample analog of (7) for ξit+1 (β, ρ, γ) using starting values for the unknown
parameters β, ρ and γ. In practice, we use OLS estimates for β as starting values and
retrieve starting values for the other parameters from the implied values of ωit . Through
iteration we then obtain as estimates those value that minimize this criterion. Finally, we
use these estimates to recover the implied (log) productivity: ω̂it = yit − β̂l lit − β̂k kit −
β̂m mit .

5.3

The effect on TFP

Unlike the variables explored in Section 5.1 (output and inputs), TFP is not directly
observed, but estimated. We propose two alternative methods to quantify the effect of
25

That is:
ξit+1 (β, ρ, γ) = φ̂it+1 − βl lit+1 − βk kit+1 − βm mit+1



2
− ρ1 φ̂it − βl lit − βk kit − βm mit − ρ2 φ̂it − βl lit − βk kit − βm mit

3
− ρ3 φ̂it − βl lit − βk kit − βm mit − γ1 Di − γ2 τt − γ3 Tit − γ4 Xi .
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the EU ETS on TFP. In the spirit of the “conditional difference-in-differences” strategy
of section 5.1, these approaches take into account the correlation of the treatment status,
the firm’s size, and productivity.
Our first and preferred method is fully consistent with the structural model. In our
approach, equation (4) is instrumental to form moment conditions to estimate the production function. However, it also provides a model of how ωit evolves conditional on the
policy variables. Since we need an estimate of (4) to estimate the production function (3),
the comparison between treated and control firms intervenes directly at this stage. Similar
to the conditional diff-in-diff, we can interpret estimates of γ3 as the short-run treatment
on the treated effect of the EU ETS on productivity. This method has the advantage to
provide valid inference, which is assured by the same (block-)bootstrapping procedure we
use to provide standard errors to the estimates of β. The main drawback is that semiparametric approaches, such as matching, are not implementable within the structural
model. To address selection into treatment we rely instead on parametric assumptions on
how Xi enter in the TFP’s law of motion.
The second approach we implement uses the estimates of ω̂it as data and applies
the same conditional difference-in-differences strategies used for the other variables and
introduced in Section 5.1. This is, for example, the approach adopted by De Loecker
(2007) in a different context and by Lutz (2016) and Marin et al. (2018) in studying the
EU ETS. In practice, we estimate the three parametric models described by equation (2)
as well as the semi-parametric model, using ω̂it as the outcome variable. Proceeding this
way has two advantages. First, it produces results that are more easily comparable to
those on the other outcomes of interest because it uses a similar estimation techniques.
Second, it allows the use of a matching procedure to impose a tighter comparison between
treated and control firms than the one granted by linear controls. The main drawback of
this approach is that standard inference is invalid and using bootstrap is computationally
unfeasible, or simply invalid.26 We estimate the effects using this approach for comparison
26
The problem emerges because ω̂it is generated data and comes with an estimation error, which must
be accommodated in building confidence intervals for the ATT. Even the case of conditional differencein-differences with linear controls is problematic in practice. A valid approach in this case consists
in (block-)bootstrapping the first stage (the production function estimation) and not re-sampling in
the second stage (the diff-in-diff), to obtain the estimated standard errors. We found this approach
computationally unfeasible. Since we have two specifications with propensity scores, one parametric and
one semi-parametric, we would need to accommodate this additional stage in the bootstrapping procedure
(Abadie and Imbens, 2008). In this case, a valid bootstrapping procedure would build on Otsu and Rai
(2017).
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with the existing literature but, given its invalid inference, we caution against relying too
much on these estimates.

6

Results

In this section, we present the estimated effect of the policy on intermediaries, capital
and labor expenditures, and on gross outputs. Then, we report the production function
estimates based on the estimation procedure. We use these results to explore how firms
changed their production processes, through the lens of the conceptual framework of
Section 4. Finally, we provide estimates of the effect of the EU ETS, following the two
empirical strategies described in Section 5.3.

6.1

Effects on firms’ inputs and output

As described in Section 5.1, we run different conditional difference-in-differences specifications to identify the effect of the introduction of the policy on input expenditures. Table
3 presents the results of the four conditional diff-in-diff strategies, reporting the average
treatment on the treated (ATT) and the coefficients of the other policy variables, for five
outcomes of interest: gross output, expenditures for intermediates, labor and capital, and
the ratio of intermediates over gross output. The first three columns present results for
the parametric specifications: column 1 includes all the controls, Xi , i.e. size and market
controls and their transformations; column 2 includes instead the propensity score as a
linear control; and column 3 includes firm-specific fixed effects. Finally, column 4 presents
the semi-parametric matched diff-in-diff estimates.
The results are similar across them despite the substantial differences in the specifications. Notice in particular how the matching procedure restricts the number of firms
analyzed with respect to the parametric specifications. Treated firms present characteristics that are very different from the untreated firms: only 1.95% of total firms are in the
common support and an even smaller fraction is matched (583 total firms). This does not
severely impact results, which are similar in sign and magnitude across the specifications.
We find that the EU ETS increased on average total output and intermediates expenditures. Gross output increased by 13 to 23% and intermediates expenditures by 16 to
27% overall in the nine post-treatment years we consider. The estimates are lower and
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Table 3: Conditional Diff-in-diff results
Linear controls PS control

FE

Matching

0.2013∗∗
(0.0620)
0.4603∗∗
(0.1763)
0.0331∗∗∗
(0.0067)

0.1781∗∗∗
(0.0153)

0.1272∗
(0.0523)

0.1905∗∗
(0.0712)
0.4105∗
(0.1994)
0.0268∗∗
(0.0083)

0.1822∗∗∗
(0.0207)

0.0629
(0.0591)
0.2910
(0.1742)
0.2106∗∗∗
(0.0064)

0.0378∗
(0.0175)

Gross output (log)
ATT (α̂3 )
Treat. Group (α̂1 )
Treat. Date (α̂2 )

0.2287∗∗∗
(0.0445)
0.2175∗∗∗
(0.0593)
0.1040∗∗∗
(0.0039)

0.0991∗∗∗
(0.0012)

Materials expenditures (log)
ATT (α̂3 )
Treat. Group (α̂1 )
Treat. Date (α̂2 )

0.2697∗∗∗
(0.0520)
0.2033∗
(0.0823)
0.1030∗∗∗
(0.0057)

0.1622∗∗
(0.0594)

0.0826∗∗∗
(0.0017)

Labor expenditures (log)
ATT (α̂3 )
Treat. Group (α̂1 )
Treat. Date (α̂2 )

0.0631
(0.0419)
0.0671
(0.0363)
0.2698∗∗∗
(0.0035)

0.0168
(0.0465)

0.2858∗∗∗
(0.0014)

Capital expenditures (log)
ATT (α̂3 )
Treat. Group (α̂1 )
Treat. Date (α̂2 )

0.1852∗∗
(0.0609)
0.5968∗∗∗
(0.0747)
0.2939∗∗∗
(0.0063)

0.1293
(0.0804)
0.8250∗∗∗
(0.1949)
0.1917∗∗∗
(0.0096)

0.1151∗∗∗
(0.0247)

-0.0112
(0.0709)

0.2667∗∗∗
(0.0020)

Materials / Gross output
ATT (α̂3 )
Treat. Group (α̂1 )
Treat. Date (α̂2 )
Observations
Firms

0.0521∗
(0.0249)
-0.0191
(0.0365)
-0.0072∗
(0.0030)

0.0049
(0.0265)
-0.0524
(0.0450)
-0.0217∗∗∗
(0.0034)

-0.0243∗∗∗
(0.0010)

745,009
73,331

348,557
21,246

927,170
109,710

0.0165
(0.0118)

0.0512∗
(0.0259)

583

Only coefficients of the policy variables are reported. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level for the first three specifications and block-bootstrapped for
matching (500 repetitions).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

more reliable in the matching specification, because it does a better job at controlling for
firm attrition, limiting the analysis on a sub-sample of firms that stay in the market for
the whole period. In relative terms, we find some evidence that the material intensity,
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i.e. the expenditure for intermediates over revenue, has slightly increased. In contrast,
expenditures for labor have not increased as a consequence of treatment. Evidence for
capital is less unequivocal and only some specifications point in the direction of a positive
effect. Across industries, the matching specification provides substantially different results for capital, when compared to the parametric ones (but not for the other outcomes of
interest). We posit that the matching procedures drop the smaller firms from the control
group and that these firms have systematically different investing patterns.
Under the lens of the conceptual framework of Section 4, we interpret the results
as follows. Firms reacted to the introduction of the policy changing their production
processes, rather than simply adjusting inputs and output for the given technology. If
not, the effect of the EU ETS would be negative on both the output and the inputs.
Instead, we observe an overall increase of economic activity in the treated firms. These
results are consistent with evidence that emissions trading did not lower employment nor
gross output of manufacturing firms (Petrick and Wagner, 2014).
The across-the-board increase in material expenditures is consistent with fuel switching. Since less polluting fuels are more expensive, fuel switching should increase material
expenditures compared to unregulated firms. Systematic fuel switching is also consistent
with two phenomena reported to us during interviews with the Italian Emissions Registry
managers: the increase in biomass use and the substitution of coke with natural gas in
regulated installations. Biomass and natural gas are usually more expensive than coal,
but they are associated with lower expenditures for EUAs (biomass is exempted and gas
has a lower carbon content).
Third, these results suggest a more structural intervention on production processes
than just fuel switching. A structural change in production is consistent with a slow
adjustment and persistent policy effects on output, intermediaries and labor. This point
is well illustrated in Figures C.1 to C.4 in Appendix A. Variations in the revenue share
of input expenditures could be caused by firm re-optimizing inputs after a change in
production and changes in performances could be consistent with changes in TFP. None
of these results are fully conclusive. Hence, we proceed below with a structural estimation
of the production function to assess these hypotheses.
As a robustness check, we investigated whether partially regulated firms, i.e. firms
with only a fraction of controlled plants under EU ETS, responded differently than fully
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regulated firms. To do so, we tested whether these firms faced an incentive to reallocate
inputs from the regulated plants to the unregulated ones they control. We regressed the
plant-level annual change in the number of employees on a dummy variable for being
regulated, taking into account only firms with at least one plant under the EU ETS and
the years 2004-2012, and controlling for region and industry fixed effects. This strategy
is equivalent to test the null hypothesis that the (conditional) mean number of employees
in regulated and unregulated plants is the same. The results need to be interpreted
with caution because of the limited trailing years of data in our possession. Nonetheless,
we do not find any statistical difference between the two groups, reinforcing our general
identification strategy.27
Table 4: Diff-in-diff results by industry
Materials (mit )
FE
Matching

Labor (lit )
FE
Matching

Capital (kit )
FE
Matching

Output (yit )
FE
Matching

Food products and beverages (N. firms: 24,253; 91 )
-0.2015∗
0.1357∗∗
-0.154
-0.0495
0.1035
(0.0823)
(0.0488)
(0.0625)
(0.0509) (0.0988)

-0.1705
(0.12)

0.1498∗∗∗
(0.0405)

-0.1225
(0.0865)

Textiles (N. firms: 13,295; 35 )
-0.2838∗∗∗
-0.0866
0.1641
(0.078)
(0.1251)
(0.0591)

-0.3683∗∗∗
(0.091)

0.0687
(0.1156)

-0.1974∗∗∗
(0.0536)

0.0674
(0.0654)

Pulp, paper and paper products (N. firms: 3,843; 158 )
0.2994∗∗∗ 0.3926∗∗∗ 0.0942∗∗
0.1157∗
0.1743∗∗∗
(0.0297)
(0.0462)
(0.0463)
(0.0323) (0.0712)

0.0439
(0.0804)

0.2960∗∗∗
(0.0252)

0.3121∗∗∗
(0.0586)

Basic chemicals (N. firms: 6,977; 47 )
-0.059
-0.0676
-0.0941
-0.0574
(0.0636) (0.1128)
(0.088)
(0.0572)

0.5452∗∗∗
(0.1267)

0.0714
(0.0492)

-0.0458
(0.0922)

Other non-metallic mineral products (N. firms: 13,210; 152 )
-0.0439
0.0941
0.1664∗∗∗
0.0434
-0.0158
-0.2140∗
(0.0348)
(0.0485)
(0.0811)
(0.0974)
(0.0418) (0.1055)

0.0569
(0.032)

-0.0016
(0.0864)

0.4228∗∗∗
(0.0523)

0.4407∗∗∗
(0.0896)

Basic metals (N. firms: 3,208; 49 )
0.4545∗∗∗ 0.4448∗∗∗ 0.1684∗∗
(0.0688) (0.1327)
(0.058)

0.1074
(0.0612)

-0.0114
(0.0853)

0.1860∗
(0.0903)

0.1166
(0.0767)

0.1898
(0.135)

Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) of the EU ETS on (log) inputs and output, by industry. The
numbers in parenthesis next to the industry name represent the number of firms (treated and controls)
in the analysis for the fixed effects and matching specification respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
27
We find that, on average, regulated plants decrease by 0.5 employees less than non-regulated ones.
The standard error of this estimate is 3.1, hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis.
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6.1.1

Industry results on inputs and output

We complement the aggregate results with an industry analysis, focusing on the “process regulated sectors”28 and two industries characterized by a large number of regulated
firms (“Food products” and “Textile”). Table 4 presents the estimates of the ATT for
two specifications, fixed effects and matching, by industry and outcome of interest. We
choose these two specifications as they differ the most in the estimates and are based
on substantially different identifying strategies. The results show a heterogeneous effect
of the EU ETS across industries. “Pulp and paper” and “Basic metals” were the most
affected, across outcomes of interest. Firms under the EU ETS in these industries experienced an overall increase in activity, with a more than proportional increase in output
and material expenditures. The fixed effects specification (but not matching) also picks
significant increases in output and intermediates in “Food products” and a significant
activity reduction in the “Textile industry”. The only industry to significantly increase
capital endowment as a consequence of the EU ETS is “Basic chemicals”, although this
result is not robust to both specifications.

6.2

Effects on the production function

Table 5 reports estimates of the production function parameters, i.e. the output elasticity
to inputs, following Section 5.2. Since production processes vary across industries, we
perform the analysis at the 2-digit industry level. We report the results for the five EU
ETS process regulated sectors29 (Pulp and paper, Coke and refined petroleum, Basic
chemicals, Other non-metallic mineral products and Basic metals) and the other two
industries with enough regulated firms to identify the elasticities of inputs with respect to
outputs (Food and beverages and Textiles). For each input (material, labor and capital),
we present the results as follows. The “no ETS” column shows the elasticity of pre-policy
unregulated firms, the “ETS” column shows the additional effect of being a firm under the
EU ETS policy, the “Post-Policy” column reports the difference in the elasticities after
the introduction of EU ETS and the “Post-Policy ETS” columns report the estimate of
the differential effect in the elasticity for firms under EU ETS after its introduction. The
output elasticity for firms under EU ETS after the introduction of the policy is equal
28

We however exclude here Coke and refined products, for which the number of regulated firms in our
dataset is too small to provide meaningful results.
29
See Appendix B
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to the sum of all columns.30 For brevity, we do not provide standard errors for these
sums, but in most cases they are extremely small. This is due to the very large number
of observations we have (standard errors are indeed larger for treated firms, which are
sensibly less).
Results show that, independently from the policy, firms that are under the EU ETS
have an inherently different production function than those that are not. For instance,
regulated firms have an output elasticity of capital often larger than unregulated ones.
Not controlling for this initial difference could have lead to an overestimate of the effect
of the EU ETS on production function.
Focusing on capital and labor elasticities, we find that overall the output elasticity
to capital and labor fell after 2005 both in regulated and unregulated firms. It fell even
more among firms subject to the EU ETS. While statistically significant, this effect is
however small in most industries. This reduction in labor- and capital-specific productivity was not accompanied by an adjustment in labor and capital endowments (see Table
4). These results are consistent with a story of reorganization of labor and capital that
accommodates, rather than lead to, changes in the production process.
When looking at intermediates, we estimate as expected larger changes in βm in regulated firms. As mentioned in the conceptual framework, changes in this parameter could
be related to firms unobservable decisions such as changes in the quality of intermediates.
With the exception of “Pulp and paper” and “Basic chemicals”, βm has increased in all
industries by 7 to 14 percentage points. In contrast, unregulated firms increased their
material-specific productivity much less or not at all, depending on the industry. With
the results on intermediates in the previous section, these findings suggest that firms
might have undertaken fuel switching as a response to the EU ETS.

6.3

Effects on total factor productivity

In this section we report the results of the two alternative methods adopted to quantify
the effect of the EU ETS on TFP, as described in Section 5.3. We report the results by
industry, focusing on those presented in the previous section.
30

For example, take the point estimates of βm (dit ) for “Food products and beverage”: the pre-treatment
coefficients are 0.6047 and 0.6747 (0.6047 + 0.07) in the control and treatment group respectively, and
the post-treatment coefficients are 0.6146 (0.6047 + 0.0099) and 0.7542 (0.6047 + 0.07 + 0.0099 + 0.0696)
respectively.
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0.6047
(0.0000)

0.4344
(0.0000)

0.5192
(0.0000)

0.5438
(0.0000)

0.5542
(0.0000)

0.5004
(0.0000)

0.5282
(0.0000)

Food products and beverages

Textile

Pulp, paper and paper products

Coke, refined petroleum products
and nuclear fuel

Basic chemicals

Other non-metallic mineral products

Basic metals

-0.0599
(0.0001)

-0.1159
(0.0015)

-0.0185
(0.0000)

+0.0789
(0.0060)

+0.0415
(0.0003)

+0.0172
(0.0000)

+0.0700
(0.0015)

ETS

+0.0691
(0.0001)

+0.0470
(0.0001)

-0.0261
(0.0001)

+0.0565
(0.0042)

+0.0140
(0.0009)

-0.0135
(0.0000)

+0.0099
(0.0001)

no ETS

+0.1374
(0.0000)

+0.0683
(0.0001)

-0.0309
(0.0000)

+0.1182
(0.0037)

-0.0816
(0.0004)

+0.1042
(0.0000)

+0.0696
(0.0000)

ETS

Intermediaries
Post-Policy

0.2882
(0.0090)

0.3465
(0.0072)

0.2972
(0.0136)

0.2313
(0.0924)

0.2704
(0.0422)

0.3608
(0.0041)

0.2189
(0.0166)

no ETS

+0.0505
(0.0047)

+0.0165
(0.0051)

+0.0935
(0.0021)

-0.0485
(0.0926)

-0.0444
(0.0107)

-0.0167
(0.0005)

-0.0464
(0.0133)

ETS

Pre-Policy

-0.0461
(0.0115)

-0.0090
(0.0102)

+0.0814
(0.0116)

-0.1482
(0.0780)

-0.0067
(0.0429)

+0.0280
(0.0062)

+0.0237
(0.0187)

-0.2588
(0.0017)

-0.0056
(0.0058)

+0.0589
(0.0016)

-0.1056
(0.0893)

+0.0148
(0.0176)

-0.0235
(0.0015)

-0.0722
(0.0018)

ETS

Post-Policy
no ETS

Labor

Standard errors in parenthesis are computed employing a clustered bootstrapping procedure with 100 repetitions.

no ETS

Industry

Pre-Policy

0.0425
(0.0077)

0.0512
(0.0099)

0.0369
(0.0053)

0.0020
(0.0723)

0.0326
(0.0068)

0.0296
(0.0043)

0.0440
(0.0083)

no ETS

-0.0396
(0.0103)

+0.0729
(0.0043)

+0.0314
(0.0032)

-0.0636
(0.0613)

+0.0427
(0.0128)

+0.0417
(0.0011)

+0.0331
(0.0243)

-0.0476
(0.0083)

-0.0506
(0.0068)

-0.0510
(0.0061)

+0.0589
(0.0397)

-0.0158
(0.0121)

-0.0213
(0.0029)

-0.0329
(0.0203)

+0.0934
(0.0015)

-0.0562
(0.0040)

-0.0173
(0.0021)

-0.0342
(0.0732)

+0.0789
(0.0081)

-0.0792
(0.0016)

-0.0051
(0.0054)

ETS

Post-Policy
no ETS

Capital
ETS

Pre-Policy

Table 5: Production function estimates of output elasticity to inputs
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We report the results obtained from our production function estimation procedure.
Table 6 shows the estimates for γ3 in equation (4). Since ωit is the logarithm of TFP,
we interpret γ3 as a percentage change. This parameter captures a structural change on
the motion of the TFP, specific to treated firms in the treatment period, and can thus be
interpreted as the causal impact of the EU ETS on productivity under the unconfoundedness assumption. The results show rather mixed effects of the policy on Total Factor
Productivity among industry, all generally small. Two industries, Food products and
beverages and Basic chemicals, show an increase in TFP due to the EU ETS by 0.92%
and 1.61% respectively. However, the EU ETS had an overall negative and significant
impact on the other industries, although of relatively small magnitude.
Table 6: Effect of the EU ETS on TFP. Structural estimation
Industry

%

Food products and beverages

0.92∗∗∗
(0.01)

Textile

-1.02∗∗∗
(0.68)

Pulp, paper and paper products

-0.28∗∗∗
(0.03)

Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel

-1.02
(1.36)

Basic chemicals

1.61∗∗∗
(0.01)

Other non-metallic mineral products

-0.93∗∗∗
(0.13)

Basic metals

-0.25∗∗∗
(0.02)

Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment

-1.20∗∗∗
(0.01)

The table reports the estimate of the effect of the EU ETS on TFP, expressed as percentage changes of exp (ωit ) and estimated with our structural model. Standard errors in parenthesis are computed by employing
cluster bootstrap with 100 repetitions.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Together with those in the previous sections, these results suggest that most industries
have not undertook substantial technological changes as a consequence of the EU ETS.
While some industries experienced a general increase of activity (Pulp and paper and Basic metals), this has not necessarily followed from an increase in total factor productivity.
29
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This is not true for all: regulated chemical firms increased their capital investment suggesting new investments (see Table 4). Indeed, after the introduction of the EU ETS some
firms in the chemical industry converted or adopted new technologies with the explicit
goal of reducing emissions.31
Since we do not observe idiosyncratic prices, it should be kept in mind that the results
we report refer to revenue TFP, which is a mixture of technical TFP and price variations.
It is however reassuring that market shares stayed roughly constant in the period in most
industries. A change in market shares, and thus market power, in the treated firms could
be associated with an increase in output prices and mistakenly attributed to a change
in technological TFP. In two industries we observe a statistically significant increase in
the average market shares for the treated firms with respect to the control: Basic metals
(+23%) and Pulp and paper (+8%). While this fact helps explaining the increase in
output and intermediates reported above, it might bias towards zero our TFP estimates
for these two industries. TFP is endogenous to market shares and thus disentangling the
two effects is arduous. Nonetheless, in an attempt to control for the market structure, we
include the market shares as a control in our estimates and the results are not statistically
different from the one reported above.
Finally, table 7 reports results for the alternative method based on the conditional
difference-in-differences strategies described in Section 5.1. The ATTs are obtained using
ω̂it as the outcome of interest. All specifications show a decrease in TFP, with especially
large negative effects for Basic metals and Other non-metallic mineral products (cement,
clinker etc.). The matching specification show the largest results, with decreases comprised between -5% and -20% over the 10 years analyzed. Although we report estimates
for the clustered standard error, these estimates are severely biased towards zero, as they
disregard the errors deriving both from the matching procedure and the estimation of
total factor productivity. We therefore do not report significance levels.
It is reassuring that results from the structural and diff-in-diff approaches go in the
same direction, although the point estimates of the latter tend to be much larger. Part of
this difference is due to the imprecise estimates that the diff-in-diff provides. This is more
evident in the first and the second column: using linear covariates or the propensity score
31

The two main innovations were the conversion from mercury cell processes to membrane technology
in chlorine and caustic soda production and the reduction in emissions from carbon black production
(Taurino et al., 2016).
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Table 7: Effect of the EU ETS on TFP in percentage. Diff-in-diff
Linear controls

PS control

FE

Matching

Food products and beverages (N. firms: 24,253; 91 )
-0.29%
-3.16%
-0.56%
-8.19%
(2.56)
(3.53)
(1.41)
(2.34)
Textile (N. firms: 13,295; 35 )
-5.33%
-6.46%
(3.51)
(3.72)

-6.50%
(2.23)

-9.30%
(2.90)

Pulp, paper and paper products (N. firms: 3,843; 158 )
-2.02%
0.91%
-2.44%
-4.97%
(2.16)
(2.62)
(0.81)
(1.30)
Basic chemicals (N. firms: 6,977; 47 )
2.93%
-4.83%
-4.31%
(3.40)
(3.59)
(1.69)

-8.48%
(3.08)

Other non-metallic mineral products (N. firms: 13,210; 152 )
-13.67%
-12.46%
-14.24%
-19.57%
(1.40)
(1.58)
(1.07)
(1.58)
Basic metals (N. firms: 3,208; 49 )
-5.66%
-10.68%
(2.37)
(3.75)

-5.96%
(1.59)

-11.70%
(2.51)

The table reports the estimate of the effect of the EU
ETS on TFP, expressed as percentage changes of exp (ωit )
and estimated in four conditional diff-in-diff specifications.
The standard errors we report in parenthesis should be
understood as a lower bound of the actual estimates.

as controls should not substantially affect results, but the two estimates tend to diverge.
It is however possible that the diff-in-diff strategy does a better job at controlling for the
idiosyncratic firms’ characteristics, which correlate with treatment and productivity. The
matching procedure drops from the common support some of the largest treated firms
which experienced an increase in productivity, exacerbating the difference.
Overall, our results suggest that the policy had a negative effect on firms’ productivity.
While the effect is overall small and heterogeneous across industries. Although an effect
of the EU ETS on economic outcomes through productivity cannot be excluded, it seems
not to have a major impact. On the contrary, in most industries treated firms sustained
their economic performance with the help of fuel switching and despite the reduction in
TFP.
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7

Conclusions

One of the main concerns related to the introduction of carbon prices is the potential
negative effect on economic performance. Debates on this topic have animated political
discussion when the proposals for the new phases of the EU ETS were drafted. European
states are currently designing the Post-2020 EU ETS compliance Phase and the Italian
government has shown major concerns on the economic effect of more stringent regulation.
This paper contributes to this debate by investigating the causal effect of the first
three phases of the EU ETS on firms’ outcomes, production function and TFP of Italian
manufacturing firms regulated by this directive. We perform a battery of conditional
diff-in-diffs on directly observable variables, such as inputs and output, controlling parametrically and non-parametrically for size observables. To investigate individual and total
factor productivities, we estimate structurally the production function. In doing so, we
take into account the estimation bias of endogenous input choices and we allow the policy to affect both them and the technology. To estimate the effect of the EU ETS on
firm level TFP, we provide a new fully coherent structural approach to address selection
into treatment. The strength of this approach is that, contrary to other papers, provides
valid inference. We complement these findings following the literature and estimating a
matching diff-in-diff, with TFP as outcome variable.
Our results are consistent with the theoretical predictions that firms would react to
an increase in price of emissions by switching intermediates. However, we did not find
evidence of decreased outcomes or capital and labor. Across our two models for TFP we
find a small and negative effect of the policy, but our point estimates differ in magnitude.
A formal comparison of the results is made impossible by the absence of valid confidence
intervals for the matching diff-in-diff, but a computationally feasible variation of the
method by Otsu and Rai (2017), taking into account the additional production function
estimation first step could provide that.
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Appendix
A

Matching procedure

We stratify our data in 65 strata, i.e. distinct combination of industry (ATECO 2digits) and geographical area (5 Italian macro-regions). To provide a comparison measure
for firms within the same stratum, we parametrically specify the propensity score as a
function of pre-treatment age, (log) number of workers and number of plants. We proceed
to estimate it by logit.
In this stage we could have used other input and output observables, such as measures
for capital, labor or material expenditures, or an output observable. Since these measures
proxy well for size, which is correlated with the actual selection variables, they would
have helped in defining the propensity score. However, we explicitly restrain to do so,
since we use all these measures in our estimation of TFP. Chabé-Ferret (2017) shows that
selecting on pre-treatment outcome increases the bias of diff-in-diff when there are autocorrelated temporary shocks in the outcome variable. Since our main outcome variable,
TFP, is generated starting from these observables, we want to avoid that autocorrelated
shocks in them carry over into our ATT estimates, producing biased estimates. We use
2002 data to avoid the risk of firms’ strategic sorting outside of treatment: the EU ETS
had just been announced and the selection rules were not well defined yet, therefore it is
impossible that firms have influenced the treatment assignment.32
We have at least one firm on 65 strata, but we are able to estimate nontrivial propensity
scores only for 34.33 We further restrict our analysis to a balanced panel of firms: we
want to avoid that results be driven by the exit of firms or by unexpected correlations of
productivity with gaps in our data. As a result, we initially restrict our scope from 98,839
firms to 41,622 (out of which 255 are treated according to our definition). We consider
this a conservative choice, that helps address the very large size of some treated firms:
the number of matched treated firms drops to 228 (27 are dropped).
We experiment with the number of neighbors (1, 5, and 20) we consistent results. We
also explore with different calipers (between 1 and 5 standard deviations), but results
are not affected. Yet, we find the choice of the caliper to be somewhat important in
32

For the number of plants we use the closest year available to us, which is the 2004.
This means that those strata that are particularly sparse are dropped because they contain no or
very few firms in treatment or in control.
33
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this context: while a too small caliper restricts the number of matches, leaving too few
observations for reliable inference, a caliper that is too big results in loose matches. We
report the results for a caliper of 3 standard deviations, which strikes a good balance.
Table A.1: Pre-treatment difference between matched treated and control group firms

Gross output (log)

B

Treatment Control Difference
10.441
10.012
0.429
(1.414)
(1.331)
(0.877)

Labor expenditures (log)

8.316
(1.410)

8.088
(1.309)

0.228
(0.788)

Capital expenditures (log)

9.223
(1.523)

8.438
(1.254)

0.785
(1.202)

Materials expenditures (log)

9.592
(1.611)

9.237
(1.422)

0.355
(1.085)

Materials / Gross output

-0.849
(0.464)

-0.776
(0.291)

-0.073
(0.449)

TFP (log)

2.313
(0.518)

2.396
(0.267)

-0.083
(0.497)

EU ETS regulated sectors and thresholds

The sectors and the threshold are specified in the Annex I of the Directive 2003/87/EC
integrated by the Directive 2009/29/EC. “The thresholds values given below generally
refer to production capacities or outputs. Where several activities falling under the same
category are carried out in the same installation, the capacities of such activities are added
together.”
Activities: Power stations and other combustion plants ≥20MW
Oil refineries
Coke ovens
Production and processing of ferrous metals: metal ore (including sulphide ore) roasting
or sintering installations; installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or
secondary fusion) including continuous casting, with a capacity exceeding 2.5 tonnes per
hour.
Cement clinker: installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns with a
34
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production capacity exceeding 500 tons per day or lime in rotary kilns with a production
capacity exceeding 50 tons per day or in other furnaces with a production capacity exceeding 50 tons per day.
Glass: Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fiber with a melting capacity exceeding 20 tons per day.
Lime, bricks, ceramics: Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing,
in particular roofing tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware or porcelain, with a
production capacity exceeding 75 tons per day, and/or with a kiln capacity exceeding 4
m3 and with a setting density per kiln exceeding 300 kg/m3
Pulp: from timber or other fibrous materials
Paper and board: with a production capacity exceeding 20 tons per day.
Aluminium (from phase 3) Petrochemicals (from phase 3) Aviation (from 1.1.2014)
Aviation was included in 2013 and until 2016 the EU ETS applies only to flights
between airports located in the European Economic Area (EEA).

C

Figures
Figure C.1: log(Real material expenditures)
.6

.4

.2

0

15

14

20

13

20

12

20

11

20

10

20

09

20

08

20

07

20

06

20

05

20

04

20

03

20

02

20

01

20

00

20

99

20

98

19

97

19

96

19

95

19

94

19

19

19

93

-.2

Notes: We plot the coefficients of the regression of the difference of log of material expenditures between matched ETS
and non-ETS firms on the years before and during the policy.
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Figure C.2: log(Real gross output)
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Notes: We plot the coefficients of the regression of the difference of log of gross output between matched ETS and non-ETS
firms on the years before and during the policy.

Figure C.3: log(Real capital expenditures)
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Notes: We plot the coefficients of the regression of the difference of log of capital expenditure between matched ETS and
non-ETS firms on the years before and during the policy.
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Figure C.4: log(Real labor expenditures)
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Notes: We plot the coefficients of the regression of the difference of log of labor expenditure between matched ETS and
non-ETS firms on the years before and during the policy.
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